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ACTION. See Check. Married Woman. Telegraph Company.
ACT OF ASSEMBLY OF PENNSYLVANIA, April 26, 1855. See Damages.
ACT OF CONGRESS. See Admiralty. Jurisdiction.
ACT OF CONGRESS, April 30, 1790. See Indictment.
ACT OF CONGRESS, May 8, 1792. See Massachusetts.
ACT OF CONGRESS, April 20, 1818. See Constitutional Law. Indictment.
ACT OF CONGRESS, February 25, 1845. See Jurisdiction.
ACT OF CONGRESS, September 18, 1850. See Indictment.
ACT OF CONGRESS, March 3, 1851. See In Re Sinclair, - - 206
ADMINISTRATION.
The testator having'in one clause of his will left all his personal pro-
perty to his wife absolutely, by a subsequent clause gave her only a life
interest therein. Under these circumstances a special grant was ordered
to issue, which, after reciting the two clauses of the will, should authorize
the widow to take administration as the party named in them. In the
goods of Westropp, decaased, . . .. 192
ADMIRALTY. See Jurisdiction. Maritime Law.
Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction possessed by the District Courts of
the United States, on the Western lakes and rivers, under the Constitution
and Act of 1789, is independent of the Act of 1845, and unrestricted
thereby. Fox vs. The Revenue Cutter, - - 4590
AGENT. See Common Carrier. Telegraph Company.
AMERICAN VESSEL. See Jurisdiction.'
ASSIGNEE. See Fixture.
ASSIGNMENT.
The assignment, by the builders of a vessel, of the moneys to become
due on the building contract, invests the assignee with no such proprietary
49
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interest as will enable him to appear as claimant and defendant in admi-
ralty. Fox vs. The Revenue Cutter No. 1, - - - 459
The purchase by the government of a vessel for the revenue service
does not divest the same of valid liens existing at the time the title was
acquired. The government takes curn onere, and the liens may be en-
forced by the ordinary methods. 1b.
A general assignment for the benefit of creditors, with preferences
a'mong the creditors, made by insolvent debtors not residents of this State,
at their places of residence, and conveying land situated in this State, is
void as respects such land, under section 977 of the Code of Iowa, which
provides that "no general assignment of property by an insolvent or in
contemplation of insolvency, for the benefit of creditors, shall be valid,
unless it be made for the benefit of all his creditors, in proportion to the
amount of their respective claims;" notwithstanding that such assignment
may be valid by the law of the place where it was made. Loring vs.
Pairo, - 0- - - - - - - - 441
The validity of a conveyance of real estate must be determined by the
lex loci rei sit. 1b.
The judgment of a court of general jurisdiction must be presumed to be
valid, until the contrary is shown. t.
"AT SEA." See Insurance.
AUCTION.
A sale by auction "without reserve," means that neither the vendor,
nor any person on his behalf, shall bid at the auction, and that the pro-
perty shall be sold to the highest bidder, whether the sum bid is equivalent
to the real value or not. Warlow vs. Harrison, . . . . 211
The highest bona fide bidder at such an auction may sue the auctioneer,
as upon a contract that the sale shall be without reserve, if he knocks down
the hammer to the subsequent bidding of the owner; and it is not mate-
rial whether the owner or a person on his behalf bids with the knowledge
or privity of the auctioneer. -b.
The owner may, at any time before the contract is legally -completed,
interfere and revoke the auctioneer's authority, but he does so at his peril;
and'if the auctioneer has contracted any liability in consequence of his
employment and the subsequent revocation or conduct of the owner, he is
entitled to be indemnified. !b.
Semble, that a bidding by the owner, after the last genuine bidding, is
not a revocation of the auctioneer's authority. lb.
BANKRUPTCY. See Fixture.
BAR IN EQUITY. See Equity.
BOND. See City Bond. Interest on Interest. Mandamus.
BOSTON. See Delivery.
BOUNDARY LINE See Jurisdiction.
CANADA. See Jurisdiction.
CARE. See Hotel Keeper.
CARGO. See Delivery.
-CARRIER. See Common Carriers. Delivery. Passenger Carrier. Negligence.
Where goods are delivered to a carrier, and they are not transported
according to his undertaking, but are injured or destroyed, the rule of
damages is the value of the goods at the place to which they were to be
carried, less the freight. The Michigan Southern and Northern Railroad
Company vs. Caster, . . .. . . 420
Qucre, whether a railroad company receiving goods directed to a point
beyond the terminus of their route is liable for such damages at the point
to which the goods are directed. lb.
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CASES AFFIRMED.
Sullivan vs. The Philadelphia and Reading Railroad Company, 6 Casey,
234; in Pennsylvania Railroad Co. vs. Zebe, - - 27
White vs. Latimer, 12 Texas, 61; in Thompson vs. Cragg, - 496
CASES APPROVED.
Blake vs. The Midland Railway Company, 15 Eng. L. & Eq. 437; in
Pennsylvania Railroad vs. Zebe, . . . . 27
Pennsylvania Railroad Co. vs. Kelly, 7 Casey, 872; in Pennsylvania
Railroad Company vs. Zebe, - - 27
CASES COMMENTED ON.
The Genessee Chief, 12 How. 443; in the People vs. Tyler, - 403
Reeves vs. Scully, Walker's Ch. 248, and Fisher vs. Otis, 3 Chandler,
86; in Baxter vs. Roefson, - . . . 477
CASES DENIED.
Pannand vs. Jones, 1 Cal. R. 448; in Thompson vs. Cragg, - 496
CASES EXPLAINED.
Morley vs. Attenborough, 8 Ex. 500; in Hoe vs. Sanborn, - - 740
Pennsylvania Railroad Company vs. McCloskey's Ad., 11 Harris, 626;
in Pennsylvania Railroad Company vs. Zebe, - 27
CAVEAT EMPTOR. See Warranty.
The common law rule of caveat emptor stated and discussed, and its excep-
tions given. Hoe vs. Sanborn, - - - 740
CERTIFICATE. See Indictment.
CHARGE. See Point Submitted.
CHARTER. See Stevedore.
CHATTEL. See Fixture.
CHECK.
A check drawn on a bank by a depositor who has funds therein is to be
regarded in law as it is in commercial usage, as a transfer to the payee or
his assignee of the funds drawn for, and entitles the legal holder, upon
presentation and refusal, to maintain an action against the bank, whether
that holder be the depositor or a stranger. Fogarties vs. The State Bank;
Ambler vs. The State Bank, . . . . . . 393
The contract between the Bank and its depositor is, that the former will
honor the drafts or checks of the latter, whenever the latter draws upon
funds actually on deposit at the time when such check or draft is presented,
and pay the same to the depositor himself or his assignee. O'NEALL, Ch. J.
dissenting. 1. - - - 400
CITY BONDS.
The holder of a city bond issued to a plank road company or bearer,
issued in aid of the construction of the road, in pursuance of a legislative
act, is not bound to examine the records of the city to ascertain whether
the resolution of the council for issuing the bonds corresponds with the
resolution recited in the bonds. That recital binds the city. Mygatt vs.
The City of Green Bay, . . . .. 271
Where city bonds are issued to a corporation or plank road company, pay-
able in the city of New York, without express authority of law to make them
so payable; the bonds are not voidfor this reason, but the city is not bound
to transport funds to New York for such contract. 16.
The act uuder which the bonds are issued is the basis of the contract;
and dealers in such bonds are chargeable with notice of the act, it being
a public statute. 1b.
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Where the constitution of a State requires that all general laws shall be
published before going into effect, a legislative act, authorizing a city to
issue bonds for stdck in a railroad company, is not a general law within
the constitutional provision ; and the bonds are valid, although the act
was not published until after they were issued; and then in the volume of
private and local acts. Sealing vs. The City of Racine, - - - - 603
The city issuing such bonds, in pursuance of the act, cannot controvert
the constitutional power of the Legislature to declare, in the body of the
act, that it shall take effect immediately after its passage. lb.
After the act was published, the city authorities paid the interest on the
bonds for several years; and the inhabitants of the city elected commis-
sioners to represent the stock received for the bonds, while they were
passing as promissory notes payable to bearer. These acts are an affirm-
ance of the bond§ in favor of a bona fide holder. He was not bound to
look further than the act. lb.
An act authorizing a city to issue bonds payable in twenty years, allowed
the city to make the bonds payable twenty years from the date of the act.
The bonds are valid, although they were not made payable twenty years
from their date. 1b.
The city of Madison, before the publication of its charter, issued certain
bonds, and subsequently levied and collected a tax to pay the interest on
such bonds, and paid it to the holders of the bonds; held, that this was such
a ratification of the bonds as would bind the city, provided it would have
been bound if the charter had been in force at the time the bonds were
issued. Mills, Respondent, against Gleason, Treasurer, &c., Appellant, - 693
CIVIL LAW. See Warranty.
COLOR OF TITLE. See Texas.
COMMERCE. See Constitutional Law. Maritime Law.
COMMISSIONER'S DEED. See Texas.
COMMON CARRIERS. See Carrier.
A railroad company, in making contracts as common carriers, are not re-
stricted to the line of transit described in their act of incorporation. Per-
kins vs. Portland, Saco and Portsmouth Railroad Company, - - 734
And if such a company, in making contracts to carry merchandise to re-
mote places do exceed the authority, express, or implied, conferred upon
them by their charter, if there is no prohibition, they cannot plead such
want of authority against such a contract entered into by them. 1b.
And if they, having knowledge thereof, permit their agents to hold them
out to the public as common carriers to places beyond the line of their own
railroad, they are thereby estopped from denying the authority of such
agents to make such contracts. lb.
CONFESSION.
A confession of a prisoner should be given in evidence -with much cau-
tion, and the judge should carefully instruct the jury as to its weight and
value. State vs. McDonnell, - - - 609
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. See HIaritime Law.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See City Bond. Indictment. Jurisdiction.
A law which provides that after a certain date a majority of the officers
of railroad corporations shall reside within the State granting the franchise,
under penalty of forfeiture of the charter in case of non-compliance, is
constitutional, does not impair the obligation of a contract, and may be
enforced against a corporation chartered and organized before its passage.
Texas vs. South Pacific Railroad, - - - 76
The constitution of Texas provides that the Legislature may revoke and
repeal the charters of all private corporations, by making compensation
for the franchise; this provision is not to be construed into a limitation
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upon the power of the State confining it to that mode of revocation alone.
The State of Texas vs. The Southern Pacific Railroad Company, - 78
The system of making city improvements by cities, by grading and im-
proving streets, and taxing the owners of lots therefor by the front foot,
is constitutional. Weeks, Appellant, against the City of Milwaukee,
respondent. - . . . . . . 624
The judiciary have no power to inquire into or corect any matter of
enlargement of city boundaries by annexation of new territory made by
the Legislature, as that is a matter within their discretion; and when such
territory is annexed, it must be taxed the same as other lands within the
city limits. lb.
Congress has the constitutional power to prohibit the foreign slave trade.
The United States vs. Gould; The United States vs. Brodnax, - - 525
That power is part-of the power to regulate foreign commerce. It is
commercial in its character, and has the same extent and application, and
the same limits, as the power to regulate foreign commerce. lb.
The several States have the general sovereign right, to determine who
may or who may not live within their limits, to fix the political and social
status of each inhabitant, and to prescribe his rights and punish their vio-
lation within its limits. lb.
This portion of State sovereignty has not been wholly surrendered to
the General Government. It is surrendered only to the extent and for the
purposes specified by the Constitution. As respects negroes, imported as
slaves, itis surrendered only so far as to allow the prohibition of such im-
portation, and, as a means to this, the removal of negroes unlawfully im-
ported. The power to prescribe and to protect the rights of such negroes,
after the importation, is entirely complete and ended, and they have be-
come mingled with the mass of the population of a State, and such power
is exclusively in the State government. !b.
It is settled, by repeated decisions of the Supreme Court, that the com-
mercial power of the General Government extends to and covers (exclu-
sively of the interference of State laws) the importation of either goods
or persons, until the commercial transaction of importation is complete and
ended, and no further. When the goods or persons imported pass out of
the possession or control of the importer, his agents, and employees, and
become mingled with the mass of property or population of a State, they
then become subject to the State jurisdiction and laws. 1b.
The laws of the United States, prohibiting the foreign slave trade, are
to be construed in reference to the mischief intended to be remedied, and
to the nature, extent, and limits of the Constitutional power of Congress
over this subject. lb.
The sole mischief intended to be remedied was the importation of ne-
groes as slaves. It was not, and is not, the manner in which either free
negroes or slaves are regarded or treated in any State. The United States
vs. Brodnax, .- 525
These laws extend to all persons who, in any manner, directly or indi-
rectly, participate, aid, or abet, in the prohibited importation. They do
not extend to offences committed in a State against the rights of a negro
who had been previously unlawfully imported by some other person, after
he has passed out of the possession or control of the importer and become
mingled with the mass of the population of a State. lb.
An indictment which only charges that the accused, within the State,
did hold, sell, or otherwise dispose of, a negro or a slave, who had pre-
viously been unlawfully imported by some other persons, without alleging
that the accused did participate, aid, or abet, in the unlawful importation,
is fatally defective. Ibid.
The mode ff procedure prescribed by the 7th section of the act of April
20, 1818, for enforcing the penalty for violating its provisions, is a qui
tam action, an. 1no other. Therefore an indictment does not lie under that
section. lb;i.
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CONTRACT.
See Check. Common Carrier. Insurance. Interest on Interest. Libel
Mortgage. Obligation of a Contract. Telegraph Company. Trustee.
Warranty.
A contract for the sale of goods on a Sunday is void; but the parties,
by subsequently acting upon it as a subsisting and valid agreement, may
ratify it. Banks vs. Werts, - - - - 423
CONVEYANCE. See Married Woman.
CORPORATION. See Trustee.
COURT.
A court of the United States ought never to sit with its doors of entrance
closed, so as to prevent publicity in its proceedings. But its police must
be maintained: Where the court has not prescribed any general rule, or
made any special or particular order on the subject, the specific duty of
the marshal to maintain and regulate its police according to law is an in-
cident of his general duty to attend the court. When, during the pendency
of a particular proceeding, there is reason to believe that an unrestricted
admission of persons of a known class, or association, would endanger the
security of the administration of justice, or in any manner prevent the
police of the court from being properly maintained, the marshal, without
excluding absolutely such persons as a class, may adopt prudential mea-
sures to prevent their indiscriminate admission, regulating the exercise of
his discretion, so that their exclusion is not carried beyond the exigency
of the particular occasion. United States vs. Buck, - 540
CREDITOR. See Lien.
CRIMES ACT OF 1857. See Jurisdiction.
CRIMINAL LAW. See Jurisdiction.
It is a settled rule in Vermont, that the jury, in criminal cases, may
judge of both law and fact, but it is rather a political. or governmental
rule than a legal maxim, and should not prevent the judge from giving his
views upon the law of the case in plain and explicit terms to the jury.
The State vs. McDonnell, . . . . 609
CROPS.
Growing crops may be levied upon and sold as chattels under a writ of
fieri facias de ionis, and the purchaser under such sale acquires the right
of leaving the crop upon the soil until its maturity, and also the privilege
of entering upon the soil to gather and take away the crop. Bloom vs.
Welsh, -.. . 97
A judgment binds the land of the defendant from the time of its entry.
But, neither the judgment nor the levy of an execution upon the land
creates a lien upon the growing crops. Bloom vs. Welsh, - - - 97
Notwithstanding such judgment and levy upon the land, the growing
crops may be sold, or may be levied upon, by virtue of a subsequent exe-
cution; and such sale, or levy, will be valid and operative, provided the
crops are severed during the continuance of the defendant's title, and be-
fore the sale and conveyance of the land under the judgment. B.
The purchaser of land, under a sheriff's sale, acquires, by virtue of the
conveyance, a legal title to the growing crops then upon the land, against
a previous purchaser of the crops from the defendant in execution; such
purchase of the crops being made subsequent to the entry of the judgment
by virtue of which the land is sold. 1b.
CUSTODY. See Indictment.
DAMAGES. See Carrier. Highway. Libel. Telegraph Company. Tide
Waters.
The damages to which parents are entitled for producing the death of their
son, under the Act of 26th April, 1855, are to be estimated by the pecuniary
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value to them of his services during his minority, together with expense
of care and attention to the deceased arising out of the injury, funeral ex-
penses, and medical services, if any. This excludes damages for the suf-
fering of the deceased, which was personal to himself and did not survive,
as well as for solace, which is incapable of appreciation so as to be com-
pensated. This is the rule where the death was produced by negligence,
unaccompanied by wantonness, violence, or gross negligence evincive of
moral turpitude. In such cases, merely compensatoiy damages may be
exceeded. Penn. R. R. Co. vs. Zebe, - - - 27
DEED. See Texas.
DEDICATION. See Equity.
DEFENCE. See Mortgage.
DELIVERY. See Carrier.
Where the bark Tangier had arrived in the harbor of Boston, on the
5th of April, with a cargo of cotton, and commenced to discharge her cargo
on Monday, the 7th, and on the same day the master gave the consignees
notice of her readiness to deliver, and the wharf was filled with the bales,
which were not taken away by the consignees; a second notice was given
on Tuesday, the 8th, to the consignees, and on Wednesday morning a third
notice; on Thursday the remaining bales were unladen and placed on the
wharf. The consignees carted away five bales, and postponed taking the
rest until the next day, assigning as a reason that Thursday was "Fast
Day," by public proclamation; and, in the afternoon of that day, the cot-
ton remaining on the wharf was consumed by an accidental fire. Held,
reversing the decree of the Circuit Court, that the delivery was a good de-
livery to the consignees. and that the loss by fire could not be imposed
upon the bark. Richardson, claimant of the bark "Tangier," vs. God-
dard, - - - - - - - - - 278
A carrier by water carries from port to port, or from wharf to wharf,
and is not bound to deliver at the warehouse of the consignee; and it is
the duty of the consignee to receive the goods out of the ship, or on the
wharf; but, to constitute valid delivery, the carrier must give due and
reasonable notice to the consignee, so as to afford him a fair opportunity
of removing the goods, or placing them in safe custody. 'b.
In the port of Boston there is no general custom or usage engrafted
into the maritime law, and making a part thereof, which forbids the un-
lading of vessels, and a tender of freight to the consignees, on a day set
apart by proclamation for a church festival, fast, or holiday. lb.
Holidays do not seem to be favored in commercial law. The subject of
holidays discussed historically, and as matter of judicial decision. lb.
Reversed on appeal-from the Circuit Court of the United States fur the
District of Massachusetts. The reader will find the opinion of the Circuit
Court in thk case, 6 Amer. Law Reg. 504
DEPOSITOR. See Check.
DIRECTOR. See Trustee.
DISTRIBUTION. See Married Woman.
EASEMENT.
All public easements are under the power of the Legislature, exercising
the soverign power of the State. Commonwealth vs. Temple, - - 678
ELECTION. 8ce Insurance. Judgment Creditor. Lien. Married Women.
Mistake. Specific Performance. Trustee.
EQUITY. See Assignment.
The com,ldinants claim as owners in equity, in common with others,
of a parcel rf land in the city of Cleaveland, by boundaries designated;
which land ,riginally belonged to the stockholders of the Connecticut
Laud ComI :-y, which owned the entire Western Reserve; and that they
INDEX.
and their heirs are the representatives of such stockholders, and that the
lands of the reserve were conveyed to trustees for such stockholders ; that
in 1836 one Thomas Lloyd fraudulently procured a deed from said trustees
conveying the land claimed in the suit, and that the defendants are in
possession of said lands, with notice of the trust and fraud. The prayer
of the bill is, to set aside said fraudulent deed, dissolve said trust, and
have a partition of said land, and account of the rents and profits thereof
recebived by the defendants. Holmes vs. The Cleveland, Columbus, and
Cincinnati Railroad. - -- - - - 716
The defendants rely for a defence upon the equitable bar furnished by
lapse of time, want of title in equity in the complainants, and upon a
dedication of said land to the public by the Connecticut Land Company,
as early as 1796, accepted immediately thereafter and ever since used in
accordance with .the purposes of the dedication. They deny that they
are in possession under the title derived from said Lloyd, and aver that
they are in possession under the authority of a decree of the State of Ohio,
in pursuance of a license granted to the city of Cleveland, and using the
same in a manner consistent with the original dedication. 16.
EVIDENCE. See Indictment.
An unanswered letter, offered by the party writing it, if it be restricted
to making a demand, where this is required, or merely giving notice, is
admissible evidence; but if it contains statements framed for a different
purpose, and such statements derive no support from the other evidence
in the cause, it is inadmissible. Allen vs. Peters, . . . .- 426
If such letter does not go beyond demand or notice, or contain other
consentaneous evidence, the whole may be submitted to the jury; but the
court will scan its contents rigorously, and so instruct the jury, that undue
weight shall not be given to such evidence. lb.
EXECUTION. See Crops.
EXEMPTION. See Libel.
FAST DAY. See Delivery.
FEDERAL SOVEREIGNTY. See Indictment.
FIRE. See Delivery.
FIXTURE.
A, mortgages to B, a piece of ground; afterwards, A, still continuing
in possession, erects on the land certain buildings, in which he puts up a
steam-engine, hay-cutter, corn-crusher, malt-mill, and mill-stones, &c.,
all, except the stones, affixed to the freehold but in such a way as to be
removable at pleasure, without injury to the buildings or to themselves.
A then becomes bankrupt: Held, by two judges, (dissentiente Willes, J.,
that although the articles above mentioned were removable, and were put up
with a view to the better carrying on of A's trade or calling, yet being
put up with the object of permanently improving the inheritance, they
were, therefore, fixtures, and did not passto the assignees of A on the bank-
ruptcy. Walmsley and Another, assignees of Moore and Bankrupt vs.
Milne,- - - - - - - - 373
The relation between mortgagor in possession and mortgagee is not that
of tenant for years and landlord; therefore, assuming the above to be
trade fixtures, they were not removable, as such, by A, and, therefore, did
not, in that view, pass to his assignees, there being no evidence of any
intention, as between A and B, that articles affixed to the freehold by A,
subseqnent to the mortgage, should not become part of the mortgaged
estate. 1b.
FOREIGN PORT. See Maritime Law.
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FORFEITURE.
A general or special statute, directing a suit to be brought for a forfei-
ture, is unnecessary in order that the will of the State may be known as
to whether a forfeiture will be claimed or not. Texas vs. South. Pac.
R..- R 76
FRANCHISE. See Municipal Authority.
FRANCHISE DEFINED. Texas vs. South. Pae. R. R., - - 76
FRAUD. See Equity.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE. See Equity.
FREIGHT. See Delivery.
FUGITIVE SLAVE. See Indictment.
FUND IN BANK. See Check.
GREAT BRITAIN. See Jurisdiction.
GREAT LAKES. See Jurisdiction.
HIGHWAY. See Horse Railroad.
When a highway is laid out and opened, all persons have a right to
pass upon it at their own risk, before any work is done upon it, or any
travelled path made by the town. Dickey vs. Maine Telegraph Company, 358
The duty of the town to make a travelled path is distinct from and
subsequent to the laying out and acceptance. b.
The right of travellers to use any part of the highway is not restricted
by the limitation of the liability of the town in case of accident; but such
traveller may use any part of the highway. lb.
No private person or corporation has a right to place, or cause any
obstruction within the limits of the highway, by which any part would
become more dangerous to the traveller than in a state of nature, or as
left by the town. The extent of the liability of the town is not the
measure for such private person's liability. lb.
HOLIDAY. See Delivery.
HORSE. See Warranty.
HORSE RAIL ROAD.
The rights of the public in a highway are equal, but each person must
use it with a just regard to the rights of others. Commonwealth vs.
Temple, ... ..- 678
Every grant carries with it all incidental rights and powers necessary to
the full and beneficial 0njoyment of the grant. b.
Hence, where a heavily-loaded team was on the public street, in which
was laid, and in public use, a horse railroad, one of the wheels of the team
being on the railroad track, and the team moving at the usual rate of
speed of such teams, but at a less rate of speed than the horse car, and
the teamster was asked to remove his team from the horse railroad, but
did not; it is an obstruction of the public travel, and unlawful, and avio-
lation of the public right, and indictable. Commonwealth vs. Temple, - 678
HOTEL KEEPER.
A notice, whether general or personal, by a hotel keeper, that all valua-
ble articles must be deposited in the safe of the hotel, and if not so de-
posited, that he would not be responsible for them if lost, does not apply
to articles of personal comfort or convenience, as a watch or clothing.
Profilet vs. Hall & Hildreth, proprietors of St. Charles Hotel, - - - 561
But the hotel keeper will not be liable for the theft of such articles, if
the lodger has acted with negligence, or has not availed himself of ordi-
nary precautions for their protections. Thus, where a lodger coming to
his room late at night in a state of partialintoxication, omitting to require
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a key to his room, allowed the door to remain unfastened, and left his
watch and similar articles negligently lying on a bureau, it was held that
that the hotel keeper was not responsible for their loss. Profilet vs. Hall &
Hildreth, . ... 561
Semble, that the existence of a state of intoxication on the part of a
lodger at an inn, raises a presumption of a want of proper care over his
property on his part. .16.... . 678
HUSBAI9D AND WIFE. See Protection. Texas.
IMPLIED WARRANTY. See Warranty.
The foundation on which implied warranties rests, stated and discussed;
and the distinction between actual warranty, as matter of proof, and
implied warranty as matter of law pointed out. Hoe vs. Sanborn, - - 740
IMPORTATION OF NEGROES. See Constitutional Law. Indictment.
INDICTMENT. See Constitutional Law. Horse Railroad. Nuisance.
An indictment under the sixth section of the Act of Congres, of April
20, 1818, for the suppression of the African slave trade, can be sustained
against one who holds, sells, or disposes of an African illegally brought
into the country from any foreign kingdom, place, or country, or from sea,
no less than against any person who shall illegally bring such African into
the country. United States of America vs. Haun, . . . .- 663
The word "or" in this statute is not to be construed "and." .b.
Property in persons entering the United States with their own consent,
and mingling with property and persons in the States, in some manner and
to some extent falls under State authority, and in some manner and to some
extent is not subject to federal control, but the case is otherwise with
regard to property imported contrary to law or smuggled, or persons im-
ported against their will. 1-b.
Some account nf the federal slave laws, and their history. Tb.
A fugitive slave having been brought by the marshal under a warrant
of arrest, before the Circuit Court, the case was heard, and a certificate,
,whose contents were conformable to the requirements of the act of 18th
September, 1850, authorizing his removal to the State from which he had
escaped, was delivered to the claimant. The claimant having afterwards
made an affidavit that he apprehended a rescue, the marshal retained the
fugitive in custody, placing him in charge of certain deputies, or assis-
tants, who, when engaged in removing him, were obstructed by the defen-
dant. The acts of obstruction constituted, or included, an attempt to
rescue the fugitive from custody. When this occurred, neither the claim-
ant, nor any private person as his agent, was present. Held: that for the
purpose of the removal of the fugitive, and for incidental purposes, the
certificate had established conclusively the relation of the claimant to the
fugitive to be that of a proprietary master to his servant; that the subse-
quent custody of the marshal was lawful only in consequence of the mas-
ter's affidavit, and might have been terminated by him at any time; that
if it had been thus terminated, or had been interrupted, or had never taken
effect, the right of custody would have been in the master alone; that the
marshal's custody, while it continued, was not incompatible with any
reasonable intervention, control, direction, or participation of the master
in which the marshal might acquiesce; * but that the custody, unless actu-
ally assumed by the master, was, through his affidavit, continued in the
marshal, in the same official character in which he had held the fugitive
under the warrant of arrest; that the defendant might, therefore, have
been indicted under the 22d section of the act of April 30th, 1790, for ob-
structing the marshal as an officer; but that he was liable also to indict-
ment under the 7th section of the act of 18th September, 1850, for the
attempt to rescue from the custody of the marshal and his assistants.
The United States vs. Buck, - - - 540
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Under an indictment for such an attempt, the prosecution maybe main-
tained without the adduction of any independent evidence that the fugitive
owed service or labor, and had escaped from the State in which it was
due. The United States vs. Buck, - - - . - 540
Such an indictment contained averments of the issuing of the warrant
of arrest, and of the subsequent proceedings, including the certificate and
affidavit. These averments were preceded by allegations that the fugitive
had escaped, and that he owed, in the State from which he had escaped,
service or labor, to the claimant. Held: that the enactments of the law
of 18th September, 1850, as to the conclusiveness of the certificate, ren-
dered these preceding allegations matters of mere inducement, and that,
the certificate having been produced in evidence, no independent proof of
them was required in order to sustain the prosecution. I6.
Such a prosecution is not maintainable unless the defendant acted
"knowingly and willingly." But his only ignorance that can excuse him
is ignorance of the custody or of its lawfulness. Where he might, upon
inquiry, have really known the truth, his omission to inquire is evidence
from which his actual knowledge of the truth may be inferred. This is
particularly the case where the custody is official. lb.
INJUNCTION. See Municipal'Authority. Trustee.
IN PERSONAM. See Libel.
IN REM. See Libel. Lien.
INSURANCE.
Declaration on a policy of insurance against fire, which contained a con-
dition reserving to the company the right of reinstating the premises in
preference to the payment of claims. Plea, that defendants elected to re-
instate the insured premises, and were proceeding in the reinstating them,
until the Commissioners of Sewers caused them to be taken down as a
structure in a dangerous condition; that such condition was not caused by
the fire; and that if the Commissioners had not caused the premises to be
taken down, defendants would have restored them to the condition they
were in before the fire. On demurrer: Held, by Lord Campbell, C. J.
Crompton and Hill, JJ. (Erle, J., dissentient,) that defendants, having
elected to reinstate the premises, were bound by such election ; and the
plea showing performance to be impossible was no answer. Brown vs.
The Royal Insurance Society, . . . . 235
In an action upon a policy of insurance on a vessel for one year, com-
mencing the risk on the 27th May, 1854; and "if at sea on the expira-
tion of the year, the risk to continue at a pro rata premium until her arrival
at port of destination," it was held, that the proper construction of such
policy was that, if the vessel was, at the expiration of the year, in any
port, or if then at sea upon her return to a port, although it was an inter-
mediate port to which she had resorted for the purpose of the voyage, and
not her home port or port of final destination, the policy ceased to be
effectual, and would not cover a loss subsequently occurring. Gookin vs.
New England Mutual Marine Insurance. Company, - - - 362
The vessel thus insured having gone to San Blas, and there obtained a
license to take in a cargo of Brazil wood at Ypala, where she arrived eight
days before the expiration of the year, and there remained actually engaged
in taking in her cargo for nine days, and while thus remaining there, after
the expiration of the year, was lost. It was held, that such vessel was not
at sea at the expiration of the year, and the insurers not liable for the
loss. Gookin vs. New England Mutual Marine Insurance Company, - 362
INTEREST. See Mandamus. Mortgage.
INDEX.
INTEREST ON INTEREST.
Where in a bond, interest is made payable annually, and there is a failure
to pay it when due, interest on the unpaid interest is not recoverable with-
out a special agreement to that effect. Stokely vs. Thompson, - - 231
Whether an agreement to pay interest on interest, in order to be good,
must be made subsequently to the original obligation or not, or what con-
stitutcs its precise consideration, not determined. 16.
INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS. See Nuisance.
INTOXICATION. See Hotel Keeper.
IRREGULARITIES. See Municipal Powers.
JUDGE. See Point Submitted.
JUDGMENT. See Crops. Lien. Married Woman.
JUDGMENT CREDITOR. See Lien.
In a bill in equity by a judgment creditor to set aside a conveyance of
property by the judgment debtor, as void, and to subject such property to
execution on the judgment, it is not necessary to be shown that the com-
plainant has issued an execution on his judgment, and had it returned
nulla bona. Loreng vs. Parse, - - - 441
JURISDICTION. See Admirality.
Upon the high seas every vessel, public and private, is, for jurisdictional
purposes, a part of the territory of the nation where it belongs; and an
offence committed on board of it is an offence against the sovereignty of
that nation. But where a private ship enters a foreign jurisdiction, it
becomes, with all on board, in the absence of treaty stipulations to the
contrary, subject to the municipal laws and control of the country it visits.
The People vs. Tyler, - - - 403
When a Legislature, out of abundant caution, enumerates a great num-
ber of possible places, and punishes crimes committed in any of them,
there is no rule of construction which requires the law to be regarded as
an assertion that there are such places within the jurisdiction. It does
not, therefore, necessarily follow, because Congress in the Crimes Act of
1857 provided for the punishment of offences upon bays, creeks, havens,
and rivers, not within States nor forming a part of the high seas, that the
existence of such within the admirality jurisdiction must be assumed. lb.
The said act of 1857, being amendatory and supplementary to other acts
of identical extent, commencing in 1790, it is not to be supposed that it was
intended to use these terms in different senses at the different periods.
And, as there were, at the date of the first act, navigable waters open from
the ocean, not admitted to have been within the exclusive jurisdiction of
any particular State, and as, upon the Pacific coast, we have still some
waters of this description, there is no necessity to go beyond our own ter-
ritory to satisfy the terms of the act. And the jurisdiction referred to, by
the language used, being a local one, referring to fixed natural locality,
and not satisfied by a vessel, the claim of jurisdiction should not be ex-
tended into foreign ports, unless such an intention is clearly expressed in
the act. IS.
As the States lying upon the lakes and their connecting waters extend
to the national boundary, and their jurisdiction is co-extensive with their
territory and legislative power, the said Crimes Act of 1857, if it applies
at all to these waters, can only take effect within the United States, and
within British waters. S.
As a general principle, the criminal laws of no nation can operate beyond
its territorial limits, and to give any government or its judicial tribunals
the right to punish any act or transaction as a crime, it must have occurred
within those limits. The exceptions to this rule relate to crimes which are
peculiarly injurious to the rights or interests of the nation or of its sub-
jects, and which, if committed by its citizens or subjects, may be punished
INDEX. 781
wherever committed; as in the case of treason committed abroad, or crimi-
nal acts on the part of the crews or passengers of its ships in a foreign
port, whereby its commerce or its pacific relations with other powers would
be endangered. But these exceptions to the general rule of the locality of
crimes are never understood to be included in the general provisions of
criminal statutes, but require to be specifically mentioned and defined.
The People vs. Tyler. 403
The territory of a state or nation includes, as a part of its domain, the
lakes and rivers which lie within its limits. And these waters being thus
susceptible of appropriation as territory in the same way as the land, are
in like manner capable of division, by which a part may be appropriated
by one adjoining nation and a part by another; and, when so divided, the
part belonging to each nation is as completely a part of its territory as the
whole lake or river, if wholly within its limits. 16.
The United States and Great Britain having, in this manner, by the
treaty of 1783, divided and appropriated the lakes and their connecting
waters, the courts of neither, while this treaty remains in force, can, for
jurisdictional purposes, and especially for criminal jurisdiction, cofisider
the portion of these waters within the limits of the other, as differing in any
respect from the lands. The treaty of 1842, conceding to the vessels, &c.,
of both nations a-right of passage through the channels and passages thus
appropriated, does ndt deprive either of that complete and exclusive ju-
risdicition over that part of the lakes and rivers on its side the line which
any nation may exercise upon land within its acknowledged limits. 1h.
The said Crimes Act of 1857 was not understood or intended by Congress
to extend to any waters not essentially maritime; much less to a river in
the interior of the continent not navigable from the ocean; and least of
all to a portion of that river within the territory and exclusive jurisdiction
of a foreign sovereignty. lb.
Nor was the said Crimes Act of 1857 intended to go beyond the class of
assaults made manslaughter under the former statutes, to which it was
amendatory and supplementary; or to do more than provide for the case
of death on land, resulting from assaults which were already made punisha-
ble when death resulted at the place where the fatal blow was given. 1h.
And, therefore, manslaughter committed by a mortal blow given on the
river St. Clair, beyond the boundary line between the United States and
the province of Canada, and within a county in said province, from which
blow death ensued on land, is not within the intent and meaning of the
said act, though the blow was given on an American vessel. Ib.
The subject of admirality jurisdiction over the lakes and navigable
waters connecting them, considered, and the case of the Genesee Chief
(12 How. 443) commented on, per Christiaucy J. 1B.
The admirality jurisdiction over the said lakes and navigable waters
connecting them, and the constitutional validity of the act of Congress of
February 25th, 1845, relating to the same, considered and denied, per
Manning J. 16.
LAND LAW. See Texas.
LAPSE OF TIME. See Equity.
LEGISLATIVE POWER. See Constitutional Law. Public Corporations.
LETTER. See Evidence.
LEX REI SITAE. See Mortgage.'
LIBEL.
Where a libel was filed in rem and inpersonam for damages sustained by
a consignee in consequence of the schooner's springing a leak by reason of
her unseaworthiness, it was held, that the owner could not protect himself
against the In personam proceeding by surrendering his interest in the
schooner and claiming exemption under the Act of Congress of March 8,
INDEX.
1851, ch. 43, 9 Stat. at Large p. 635. In 'the Matter of Sinclair, part
owner of schooner Ella, .. . .. 206
This act is not to be confined to torts alone; but there being a represen-
tation of seaworthiness proceeding from the owner or his agent, there may
be a breach of the contract arising from such representation, for which the
owner will be liable inpersonam, under the true construction of the act of
1851. 16.
LICENSE. See Equity.
LIEN. See Admiralty. Assignment. Partnership.
Where land is conveyed to a trustee, to secure payment of a promissory
note made by the grantor, with power to the trustee, on failure to pay the
note when due, to sell the land, and out of the proceeds to pay the note,
and pay over the surplus, if any, to the grantor, judgments recovered
against the grantor after the conveyance and before sale of the land by the
trustee, being liens upon the grantor's interest in the land, are in equity,
liens upon the surplus proceeds of the land in the hands of the trustee,
after sale by him. Cook and Sargent vs. Dillon, Whitaker, Briggs, and
Barrow, - . .. . . . . 435
But in such case, where the judgments were of the same date, and one
judgment creditor issued execution and garnisheed the fund in the hands
of the trustee, before the other judgment creditors had taken any steps to
assert their lien: Held, that he thereby acquired a prior right to the
fund. lb.
And when one of the judgment creditors became the purchaser of the
land at the sale of the trustee, for a price exceeding the debt secured by
the deed of trust: Beld, that such purchaser could not set-off his judg-
ment against such surplus, so as to defeat the claim of another judgment
creditor who had garnisheed the trustee under execution on his judgment,
although such surplus had not in fact been paid over to the trustee by the
purchaser. 1b.
As between judgment creditors whose judgments are of the same date,
the one who first takes steps to enforce his judgment against property,
whether real or personal, subject to the lien of the judgments, acquires a
priority as to such property. lB.
It is a conceded proposition that, under the general maritime law, a lien
arises or is implied for the benefit of material-men, unless the ship be in
her home port, or credit be given to the master or owner. Harris vs. The
Schooner Kensington, - - - 144
Where a lien arises under the maritime law, for the benefit of a material-
man, it is not waived or lost because a negotiable note between the parties
to the original contract has been taken by the creditor, unless such note
was taken as payment: but if the party taking the note makes-an absolute
transfer of it, the lien is thereby extinguished; hence, where A advanced
money for a vessel's supplies and repairs in a foreign port, and the master
drew a draft on the owner, which was accepted, but which subsequently
came into the libellant's possession and control, and was brought into
court to be cancelled, it was held that the lien was not extinguished. lb.
The cases fully cited and commented on. lB.
LIFE ESTATE. See Will.
IANAGER OF CORPORATION. See Trustee
MANDAMUS.
Mandamus is the proper and appropriate writ to compel a municipal
corporation to make provision for the payment of interest due upon bonds
issued by the same in payment of its subscription to the stock of a railroad
company, by the assessment and collection of the necessary taxes. Com-
menwealth ex rel. Hamilton vs. The Select and Common Councils of
the City of Pittsburg, composed of D. Fitzsimmons, et al., - - 2 6
Mandamus is the proper remedy where there is a clear legal right in the
relators, a corresponding duty in the defendant, and a want of any other
adequate and specific remedy. lb.
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MANSLAUGHTER. See Jurisdiction.
That the law implies malice from a killing with a deadly weapon, and
imposes upon the accused the burden of showing the contrary, is a prin-
ciple recognized and fully established. State vs. O'Donnell, - - 609
The true rule in cases of mutual conflict stated and explained. 1b.
What facts reduce a crime from murder to manslaughter. Ib.
MARITIME JURISDICTION. See Jurisdiction.
MARITIME LAW.
An action for a joint tort against two or more cannot, in the admiralty,
be united with a tort against one separately, if the objection be taken.
Roberts rs. Skolfield. - . - - 156
The general maritime law was adopted by the constitution of the United
States, and no state can have a separate and distinct maritime law by
itself lb.
This law governs the crews of the vessels of the United States, wherever
they go, whether in a port of the Union or a foreign port. lb.
When the constitution adopts the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,
it adopts also the law by which it is governed. 1b.
The power of -the United States to govern seamen may also be derived
from the commercial power. The power to regulate commerce includes
that of navigation. 1b.
When a seaman engages in a commercial adventure, the laws of the
United States follow him until the voyage is completed, whether in a foreign
country, or the Union. 1b.
The commerce of the country is a unity, and wherever it goes, it is
governed and protected by the laws of the United States. Ab.
MARITIME USAGE. See Delivery.
MARRIED WOMEN. See Mortgage.
A judgment confessed by a husband in favor of his wife, without the in-
tervention of a trustee, though void at law, is valid in equity. In Penn-
sylvania the rule of equity is adopted and therefore such ajudgment, when
given bona fide, and for value will be sustained. A conveyance.executed,
or gift consummated by the husband to the wife, during coverture, is valid
in equity, and a judgment is in the nature of an executed contract. Sale
of Samuel Shade's Land, - - 753
Semble; that a wife cannot sue her husband either at law, or in equity,
during coverture, or have an adverse execution against him, but his pro-
perty having been sold by otner creditors, she will not be deprived of her
lien, or stripped of lber security. Therefore, where a husband borrowed
his wife's money, to which he had no legal claim, and promised at the time
of the loan to secure and repay it, and afterwards confessed a judgment
directly to her for the amount, it will be sustained in equity, against the
claims of creditors holding junior judgments, and the husband's land hav-
ing been sold on other judgments, the money was awarded to the wife in
discharge of her lien. 1b.
MARSHAL. See Indictment.
MASTER. See Stevedore.
MATERIAL-MAN. See Lien.
MASSACHUSETTS.
QuEsTIONs :-Whether the Legislature of this Commonwealth can consti-
tutionally provide for the enrolment in the militia of any persons other
than those enumerated in the Act of Congress approved May 8, 1792,
entitled, "An Act more effectually to provide for the national defence,
by establishing a uniform militia throughout the United States ?" In-
terrogatories propounded by order of the Governor and Council to the
Supreme Judicial Court, -. . . 167
784 INDEX.
Whether the a.foresaid Act of Congress, as to all matters therein pro-
vided for, and except as amended by subsequent acts, has such force in
this Commonwealth, independently of, or notwithstanding any State legis-
lation, that all officers under the State government, civil and military, are
bound by its provisions ? Ib.
MESSAGE. See Telegraph Company.
MICIJIGAN. See Tide Waters.
MICHIGAN INTEREST. See Mortgage.
MILITIA. See Massachusetts.
'MISREPRESENTATION. See Mortgage.
MISTAKE.
To enable a court of equity, upon the ground of mistake, to reform a
written contract, the mistake must be proved to be the mistake of both
parties; so that, by correcting the writing as requested, the court will
make it express the contract designed to be entered into by both. A court
of equity may, however, rescind and cancel a contract upon the ground of
a mistake of facts, material to the contract, of one party only ; but where
there has been no fraud or surprise to put the applicant for such relief off
his guard, it must appear thpt the mistake was not the consequence of his
own want of recollection, from inaitention, or of his own carelessness;
and that by granting him the relief he asks, no injustice, and especially
from the applicant's neglect to apprise him of the mistake, will be done to
the other party to the contract. Diman vs. The Providence, Warren, and
Bristol Railroad Company, - - - 104
Hence a subscriber to the stock of a railroad company, chartered, but
waiting for subscriptions in order to organize under its charter, can have
no relief in a court of equity, on the ground that when intending merely
to renew an old subscription to the stock, which had fallen through, he, by
some unaccountable mistake, subscribed for double the amount; such sub-
scriber ascertaining his mistake immediately after his subscription, and
suffering the company to organize and act upon the faith of his subscrip-
tion, during several months, without notice of his alleged mistake. 16.
MORTGAGE. See Fixture.
Where a married woman executed a mortgage upon her separate pro-
perty under representations which were false and fraudulent, which mort-
gage would not have been executed had such misrepresentation not been
made, and at the same time her husband made a negotiable promissory
note which was secured by, and accompanied this mortgage, and such
negotiable promissory note passes into the hands of a holder without notice
for value, the wife may make a valid defence to such note, because the
mortgage is the principal debt, and the negotiable paper is incident to it.
Baxter vs. Win. F. and Emily A. Roelofson, - - - 477
A mortgage is in no sense a security similar to a negotiable promissory
note, and does not allow the principles of law which apply to notes or bills
to be applied to it. lb.
Where a married woman mortgages her separate property to secure the
notes of her husband, and such mortgage is procured by misrepresenta-
tion, she may defend against a suit to foreclose, when it is attempted to
charge the land with the debt, when no defence would be open to her
husband in an action against him on the notes by an innocent holder for
value. lb.
A mortgage was executed to secure to the plaintiff a loan for two thou-
sand dollars on real estate in Michigan, with ten per cent. interest, pay-
able semi-annually, in New York; the loan to be paid in six years. In
New York, if more than seven per cent. interest be stipulated for, it is
usurious, and the instrument is void. Fitch vs. Remer, - - - 654
In 'Michigan, the legal rate of interest is fixed at ten per cent., and a
higher rate of interebt is not recoverable, though agreed to be paid. T5.
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Suit was brought on the mortgage, and the court held, that the plaintiff,
a citizen of New York, was entitled to a judgment on the mortgage, with
ten per cent. interest., the legal rate of interest in Michigan. Fitch vs.
Remer, . .. . 654
MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY. See City Bond. Mandamus.
It is a power implied in every grant of municipal authority, to dig up
the streets and highways for the purpose of securing drainage and sewer-
age essential and convenient to the public health. The North Pennsylva-
nia Railroad Company vs. Stone, -- 112
The city of Philadelphia possesses this power, by express legislative
enactment as to Front street, both by the legislation in regard to the dis-
tricts of Northern Liberties and Kensington, and by the Consolidation
Act. lb.
A railroad corporation cannot, under a grant of franchises to construct
and maintain a railroad track in a city street or highway, have the exclu-
sive use of that street and oust jurisdiction for municipal purposes; and
therefore, an injunction to restrain an agent of the city, a city contractor,
who proposes to take up temporarily a portion of the railway track in
order to build a culvert in such public street, will be refused. lb.
MUNICIPAL POWERS. See Constitutional Law.
No special act and no express provision in a charter is required to enable
a city to borrow money for purposes clearly municipal. Mills vs. Gleason, 693
The kind and character of irregularities in tax assessments which invali-
date them. JB.
MUNICIPAL SUBSCRIPTION. See Mandamus.
NAVIGABLE WATERS. See Tide Waters.
NAVIGATION. See Tide Waters.
NEGLIGENCE. See Hotel Keeper. Stevedore.
In an action against a railway company for negligence, in consequence
of which the plaintiff has suffered injury, it is for the judge to decide
whether there is any reasonable evidence of negligence proper to be left
to the jury. Cornman vs. The Eastern Counties Railway Company, - 173
A railway company kept at their station a weighing machine on a plat-
form close to the railway. On a particular occasion the plaintiff, being
there to receive a parcel, was thrown against the weighing machine and
injured:-Held, that whether there was evidence that the company were
guilty of negligence in keeping the weighing machine where they did, was
to be determined by the judge, on consideration of all the circumstances
of the case. lb.
When a passenger leaves the cars otherwise than by a safe and conve-
nient platform provided for the purpose, and death or injury results there-
from, there must be proof of some justifying necessity for his doing so, to
excuse him from negligence and the consequences of it. A voluntary
disregard of regulations provided for his safe exit by the platform, is a
disregard of his obligations to the company, and leaves them free from
liability for injuries consequent upon his act. Pennsylvania Railroad
Company vs. Zebe, 27
It is not negligence on the part of the company that they do not by
force or barriers prevent parties from leaving the cars at the wrong side.
Passengers are presumed to act reasonably in all given contingencies. lb.
NEW YORK INTEREST. See Mortgage.
NOTICE TO CONSIGNEE. See Delivery.
NUISANCE.
Works of internal improvement, erected at the expense and by the offi-
cers of the State, for the benefit of the citizens at large, never can be re-
garded by the law as a nuisance; and their transfer to the hands of a
50
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private company, with a requirement that they shall be kept up for the
purposes of their creation, in no respect changes the rule. Common-
wealth vs. Reed et al., . . . . . . . . .- 128
The Commonwealth and its agents could not have been indicted there-
for, and the company and its officers occupy precisely the same position.
lb.
"OBLIGATION OF A CONTRACT."
"The obligation of a contract" discussed, and authorities cited. Texas
vs. South Pacific Railroad, 7(;
6BSTRUCTION. See Highway. Tide Waters.
OBSTRUCTION OF OFFICE. See Indictment.
PARTITION. See Texas.
PARTNERSHIP.
An agreement between one partner and a third person, that the latter
shall participate in that partner's share of the profits of the firm, as pro-
fits, renders him liable as a partner to the creditors of the firm, although,
as regards the other members of the firm, he is not their copartner. Fitch
and others vs. Harrington,. --. . . . .- 688
The acts and declaration, of a person not a partner, are not admissible
to charge him as a partner, without showing that they were brought home
to the plaintiff's knowledge. 1b.
The rule of equity, that partnership creditors shall have a preference as
to partnership property, and separate creditors as to separate property,
has no application to a suit in equity by a judgment creditor of the firm,
against the judgment debtors, and their assigned, to set aside as void an
assignment of property belonging to one of the partners, and to establish
the lien of the complainant's judgment thereon. Loring vs. Pairo, - - 441
PASSENGER CARRIER.
The law implies in the contract of carrying passengers by railroad com-
panies, that they shall provide a safe and sufficient road and cars, compe-
tent and careful conductors and hands, and safe and convenient means of
egress and regress from the line of their road. There must be no negli-
gence on their part. There is also on the part of the passenger an im-
plied assent to all the company's reasonable rules and regulations for
entering, occupying, and leaving their cars, and if injury befall him by
reason of his disregard of regulations which are necessary to the conduct
of the business, the company are not liable in damages, even though the
negligence of their servants concurred with his own negligence in causing
the mischief. Pennsylvania Railroad Company vs. Zebe, - - 27
PASSENGER RAILROAD. See Horse Railroad.
PERFORMANCE. See Insurance.
PHILADELPHIA. See Municipal Authority.
PITTSBURG. See Mandamus.
POINT SUBMITTED.
It is necessary that each point submitted to the court, if relevant and
material to the issue, be substantially answered in the relation in which
it was put. It is not quite enough that an answer may be deduced from
observations in other connections and relations to other facts. Pennsyl-
vania Railroad Company vs. Zebe and wife, 27
POSSESSION. See Equity.
PRESENTATION. See Check.
PRINCIPAL. See Telegraph Company.
INDEX.
PRIORITY. See Lien.
PROMISSORY NOTE. See Mortgage.
A note which accompanies a mortgage is subsidiary to the mortgage,
and cannot be treated as an independent contract of itself. Baxter vs.
Roelfson,- - - - - - - - - - - 477
A defence valid on the ground of fraud as between mortgagor and mort-
gagee will be valid as between the mortgagor who is the maker of a nego-
tiable note secured by mortgage and an endorsee of such note, even though
the latter be a holder for value. lb.
PROTECTION.
The husband will be entitled to the protection of the court, where the
wife's passions, from whatever cause, are so little under control that she
is in the habit of using personal violence to the husband, from which
habit he may be in danger of bodily injury, though no actual serious in-
jury has been inflicted. White vs. White, . . . . .- 6.37
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS.
In respect to public corporations, which exist for public purposes alone,
like counties, cities, and towns, the Legislature, under proper limitations,
have the right to restrain, modify, enlarge, or change them, providing,
however, that property owned by such corporations shall be secured for
the use of those having an interest in it. Inhabitants of North Yarmouth
vs. Skillings, 307
If a town is divided, and a part of its territory, with the inhabitants
thereof, is incorporated into a new town, the old town will retain all the
property, and be responsible for the existing liabilities, unless there is
some legislative provision to the contrary. 1.1
But, upon such division, the Legislature have constitutional authority
to provide that the property, owned by the original town, shall be appro-
priated or held for the use and enjoyment of the inhabitants of both towns,
and to impose upon each town the payment of a share of the corporate
debts. lb.
If, upon such division, the original town holds any property, such as
flats, sedge banks, or fisheries in trust, for the use of all the inhabitants,
the Legislature may provide that the original town shall still hold such
property in trust for the inhabitants of both" towns. B.
In regard to property so held in trust, whether the Legislature, by
dividing the town, without making any such provision, could deprive a
part of the inhabitants of their accustomed use of it,-guwre. lb.
QUO WARRANTO.
The common law remedy of quo warranto is adopted in Texas. Texas
vs. South Pacific Railroad, 76
The district attorney, who is a State officer and charged with the duty
of prosecuting all actions in which the State is interested, is bound to
institute a quo warranto for the forfeiture of a charter of a corporation,
when the law has declared that upon the happening of certain events, or
the omission of certain things, cause of forfeiture has arisen, and the fran-
chise ought to be reclaimed by the sovereign. Bid.
RAILROAD. See Carrier. Common Carrier. Hlorse Railroad. Passenger
Carrier, Negligence.
RIPARIAN OWNERS. See Tide Waters.
SALE. See Texas. Warranty.
SALE BY SAMPLE. See warranty.
SEAMEN. See .Maritime Law.
INDEX.
' EDUCTION.
The plaintiff's daughter was the domestic servant of the defendant's
father; the plaintiff having a contract to make shirts, similar contracts to
which she had frequently, employed her daughter at the defendant's
father's house, when she had finished her mistress's work, during over
hours and leisure time, and with her mistress' knowledge and consent, in
helping her to make these shirts. During this time, and when in de-
febdant's father's service, she was alleged to have been seduced by the
defendant. Held, in an action against the defendant by the mother for
the seduction of her daughter, that this was not sufficient evidence of loss
ofservice to support the action for seduction. Thompson vs. Ross, - 188
.ERVANT. See Seduction. Stevedore. Telegraph Company.
,ERVICE. See Seduction.
SHERIFF'S SALE. See Crops.
SHIP. See Delivery. Stevedore.
SLAVE LAWS. See Indictment.
LAVE TRADE. See Constitutional Law. Indictment.
S jIL. See Fixtures.
It is a question of evidence, depending on circumstances and the inten-
* tion of the parties, whether A's chattel, fixed on B's soil, becomes part
of the soil, or remains the chattel of A. Lancaster vs. Eve, - - :77
Piles fixed in the bed of the Thames, in front of a wharf, for the pur-
pose of mooring vessels making to the wharf, and long enjoyed for such
purpose without interruption by the Crown or the conservators of the river,
will be taken to have been put down in the exercise of an easement, and
to remain as chattels in the owners of the wharf, so as to give them a right
of action against any one injuring the piles. 1b.
SOVEREIGN. See Constitutional Law.
SPANISH JURISPRUDENCE. See Texas.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
This court will entertain a bill for the specific performance of an agree-
ment to purchase a chattel; but, if the case made at the hearing shows
that the price was inadequate, and the transaction upon the whole unfair,
the bill will be dismissed; and that, although the court would not have given
relief to a party had he sought, in the same case, to set the agreement aside.
Falcke vs. Gray, . . .. 116
STATE AUTHORITY. See Indictment.
STATE WORKS. See Nuisance.
STEVEDORE.
Where a stevedore is appointed by the charterer to superintend the
loading of a general ship, and such stevedore not acting under the orders
of the master in respect of such loading, is guilty of negligence, and causes
injury to goods sent to be carried on board the ship, the master is not
liable for such negligence of the stevedore. Blakie and others vs. Stem-
bridge, .. .. 182
The Gundreda was chartered by her owner to one Gallard for a voyage
from London to Port Louis for a certain freight. The captain was to be
appointed by the owner: the stevedore for outward cargo was to be ap-
pointed by the charterer, but to be paid by and act under the orders of the
captain. The ship being in port, but no crew, with the exception of the
mate, being on board, the stevedore and his men went on board for the
purpose of loading the vessel. The plaintiff, having paid the broker the
freigtht for the carriage of sonie sugar-pans, sent them aieng-ide the ship.
The L-evcdore, in loading the pans, was guilty of ntghgence, and izjury
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ensued. He received no orders respecting the loading of the pans from
the master, who was not on board: held, that the stevedore was not the
servant of the master, and that the master was not liable for the negligence
of the stevedore. Blakie and others vs. Stembridge, - - - 1S2
SUNDAY. See Contract.
TAXATION. See Municipal Powers.
The city cannot create a nuisance upon the plaintiff's lots, and then tax
him for abating it. Weeks vs. The City of Milwaukee, - - - 623
The exemption of the Newhall House (a large hotel) from taxation, by
the Common Council, was without authority of law, and vitiates the entire
tax for the year of such exemption. lb.
TELEGRAPH COMPANY.
A telegraph company that is authorized by its charter to construct its
line "along and upon any highway," by the erection of posts for sustain-
ing the wires, but not to be so constructed as to. incommode the public use
ot the highway, may be responsible for damages to an individual, occa-
sioned by such erection if improperly made, or by suffering the same to fall
down, or be out of repair, although thereby the use of the path made and
used in the centre of the highway, is not obstructed. Dickey vs. Marine
Telegraph Company, - . . .. 858
It is the duty of the Telegraph Company to transmit the messages just
as they are delivered to them. Should they not do so, they will be liable
for any loss that may ensue by the wrong transmission. The New York
and Washington Telegraph vs. Dryburg, - - - - 490
Telegraph companies, like other corporations, may be sued in their
corporate character, for damages arising from neglect of duty. lb.
Where the sender of a telegraphic message wrote "two hund bouquets,"
meaning two hand bouquets, and the agent of the Telegraph Company
translated "two hundred" bouquets, and so delivered the message to the
person addressed, by which error he caused loss and damage: held, that
the person to whom the erroneous message was sent, could maintain an
action in his own name, and that the company were liable for the loss or
damage caused by such error in transmitting. B.
Query, whether the telegraph company should not be regarded as the
agent of both the sender of and the person to whom the dispatch is ad-
dressed. lb.
A servant, as such, cannot be charged for neglect, but the principal
shall be charged for it; but for a misfeasance an action will well lie
against the servant. b.
TEXAS. Se Constitutional Laws.
Under the SpAnish jurisprudence and the principles of the laws of the
Republic and State of Texas, the interests of the husband and the wife in
the community property are severed by the death of either spouse, and the
interest of the deceased partner vests at once in his or her heirs, subject
only to the community debts. Thompson et al., Appellants vs. Cragg et
al., Appellees. Cragg et al., Appellants vs. Smalley et al., Appelees, - 497
Where the husband, (in Texas,) after the death of his wife, (leaving
children surviving,) contracted to sell the community property and executed
a bond for title, a decree, after his death, in a suit for specific performance
of the bond brought against such children, as "the heirs of their de-
ceased father," is only binding on them in that capacity, and will not
divest their interest in such community property, as the heirs of their de-
ceased mother. lb.
Nor will a commissioner's deed, made in pursuance of such decree.
vesting in the purchaser all the rights of the plaintiffs "as heirs of their
deceased father," be a sufficient title or color of title to support the plea
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of the statute of limitations of the State of Texas of three years, and de-
feat their right to a recovery in a suit brought by them as heirs of their
deceased mother. Cragg et al., Appellants vs. Smalley et al., Appellees, 497
In suits for partition in Texas, where there is no dispute as to the title,
the equities between the parties, growing out of improvements and amelio-
rations, can be adjusted by the court, with the aid of the commissioners
.appointed for that purpose. lb.
.But in cases like the present, where questions of title and good faith
are involved, it is the right of the defendant, under our statute, to have the
question of good faith submitted to the jury, and it is their further right to
have the value of their permanent and valuable improvements assessed by
a jury, and secured to them in the ultimate partition. 16.
The proper and most convenient mode to do this is to submit to the
jury issues respecting the value of the different tracts claimed by the de-
fendants, respectively, with and without improvements. lb.
The court below properly excluded from the jury evidence to the effect
that the surviving father was a poor man, and that the community pro-
perty was sold for the support of the family. To uphold sales of this
character on such grounds, would withdraw the most important rights
from the control of judicial tribunals, and leave them to the capricious
inclinations of individuals. Ib.
Where a female, under the'ngeof twenty-one years, is married in accord-
ance with the laws of this State, (quoted in the opinion,) she is deemed of
full age, and the statute of limitations commences to run against her from
the time of her marriage. lb.
The case of White vs. Latimer, 12 Tex.. 61, in this latter point, reviewed
and affirmed. b.
After the death of the husband or wife, the surviving spouse, under the
Spanish law, had no right to sell the whole of the community property,
but one-half thereof descends presently to the heirs, subject only to the
community debts. b.
The case of Pannand vs. Jones, 1 California Reports, p. 448, maintain-
ing the contrary doctrine, fully discussed and-considered, in connection
with the Spanish law on the subject, and held to be in direct conflict with
that law. lb.
TEXT BOOKS, (Use of.)
The correct method of using and applying the language of the text
books in a capital case before the jury and by the judge, explained. State
vs. McDonnell, . . .. . 609
THEFT. See Hotel Keeper.
TIDE WATERS.
In Michigan there are no tide-waters which come within the techinal
meaning of the term -,navigable," as understood in the common law.
Lorman vs. Benson, .. . . 219
The circumstance, that the State of Michigan has more than a thousand
miles of external boundary waters open to navigation, in a popular sense,
does not require the rule of the common law to be modified so as to apply
the doctrines belonging to tide-water navigable in a common law sense, to
such waters as are beyond the tidal influence. b.
Hence, a defendant was held liable, in special damages, for obstructing
the plaintiff in taking ice, by compelling him to travel, at a greater ex-
pense, a greater distance, by reason of the placing of a boom in the stream
opposite the riparian owner's shore. Ib.
The rights of riparian owners discussed, and the cases cited and com-
mented on. lb.
Rights of navigation discussed. 1b.
TIME POLICY. See Insurance.
TITLE. See Texas.
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TORT. See Libel. Maritime Law.
TOWN. See Highway.
TOWN PROPERTY. See Public Corporation.
TRADE FIXTURES. See Fixtures.
TRANSFER. See Check.
TRAVELLER. See Highway.
TREATY. See Jurisdiction.
TRUST. See Lien. Public Corporation.
TRUST PROPERTY. See Trustee.
TRUSTEE.
It may be considered as settled law, that all trustees, as well public as
private, are incapable of purchasing the trust property for their own bene-
fit, either directly or indirectly. Cumberland Coal and Iron Company vs.
Sherman, Dean and Postley, .. . . 333
A trustee cannot contract with himself, or with several trustees, of which
he is one, or with a board of trustees, of which he is one, without having
his contract liable to be set aside, if in any reasonable time his cestui que
trut chooses to say he is not satisfied with it. l?.
. trustee who purchases directly from his cestui que trust, who is 6ui
Juri, or whose contract is afterwards confirmed by the cestui gue trust,
must in every particular act with fairness and entire candor; either the
suypressio veri, or the suggesliofalsi, will avoid the sale or contract. .8h.
Hence, where A was a director and manager in one corporation, and
made a contract with such corporation on behalf of andfor another corpo-
ration wherein B was the ostensible and active manager, butA, himself the
real and effective party, by which contract substantial benefit was con-
ferred upon the latter corporation by withholding some material facts from
the stockholders of the former corporation by which they were induced to
confirm A's contract, it was held, that such contract could not be sus-
tained, and an injunction was granted. lB.
A full discussion and citation of the cases and text books wherein the
above principles are eunciated. b.
WARRANTY.
Where A sells B an unsound horse, and there is no express warranty,
and no fraud, the unsoundness of the animal amounts to neither want nor
failure of consideration, and is no ground of defence against the payment
of the price agreed upon.' Eagon vs. Call, - - - 488
The rule of the civil Iaw, that a sound price implies a warranty that the
article aold is sound, is not a rule of the common law. lb.
It cannot be generally maintained, that where the buyer has had an op-
portunity of examining the article, there is any engagement implied in the
contract of sale, that the seller warrants against latent defects, unknown
alike to himself and to the purchaser. Certainly there is no such engage-
meat in the sale of such an article as a horse. lb.
The vendor of an article of merchandise impliedly warrants that he
has a title to what he assumes to sell. Hoe et al. Respondents vs. San-
born, Appellant, . . . . . . . . 740
The rule of warranty in the civil law stated, and its application dis-
cussed. .'b.
Where a vendor, who is a manufacturer, sells an article of his own
manufacture for a purpose and a use disclosed to him, he impliedly war-
rants that such article is free from any latent defects growing out of the
process of manufactuing, ant arict b of a fair and merchant-
able quality, and reasonablyfiff r thepua *hich it was manufac-
tured by him. lb.
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Hence. where A, a vendor of saws, ordered from B, a manufacturer
of saws. certain saws adapted to a circular saw-mill, which were manu-
factured by B and sent to A, and which upon trial byA were found to be
unsound and worthless by reason of softness, and were therefore returned
to B ; it was held that B could not recover in an action on a promissory
note given as the consideration for the purchase. Hoe vs. Sanborn, - 740
WILL. See Administration.
A gift of slaves to one "for the term of his natural life, and at his death
to his lawful issue forever," vests in him a life estate only. Hancock et
at. vs. Butler, . .. . 39
UNITED STATES. See Maritime Law.
UNSEAWORTHINESS. See Libel.
USAGE. See Check.
VESSEL. See Lien.
VOYAGE. See Maritime Law.
YEAR. See Insurance.
